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transformation.
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS SHAPE PARTY STRUCTURES
Perhaps the most famous theory in the realm of electoral systems study
is Duverger’s Law— the assertion that single-member districts, using plurality
election systems, tend to produce two-party systems. This is approximately
true, though in some cases extreme social cleavages can cause a different
system to emerge.¹ The two-party outcome is predicated on the rational actor
model— the idea that both voters and parties reliably act in a way that secures
the best possible result for themselves. For example, in a multiparty space
using an SMD plurality system, two ideologically nearby parties could join
forces, and the sum of the votes for both parties would together be able to
outcompete opponents. Every party in the system would feel pressure to do
this, until only two large blocs remained. Meanwhile, voters would be
incentivized to not “waste their vote” on smaller parties they know will lose,
and instead cast their vote for the ideologically-nearest large party.²
Ultimately, this system is reductive to two broad coalitions, primarily built on
opposition to the other: the two-party system.
This theory can be taken further. SMD plurality is the most exclusionary
system that is possible within a competitive democracy, hence its outcome of
the minimum number of two competing parties. The opposite of exclusionary
systems are permissive ones, which tend to foster competition between greater
numbers of parties. More exclusionary systems feature smaller legislative
assemblies, a small number of winners per district, limits on the electoral
preference that a voter can communicate, and apportionment schemes that
favor large parties. Importantly, executive offices behave as a “legislative
assembly” with just a single member, and therefore are more exclusionary
than legislative elections contested under the same rules. Meanwhile, more
permissive systems have larger assemblies, higher district magnitudes, and
low thresholds for a party to enter the legislature.³ Any of these variables can
be tweaked in a variety of ways to produce electoral systems that are
somewhere on the spectrum between exclusionary and permissive.
Electoral systems are not the only consideration at play in the evolution
of party systems. Rather, the electoral system should be seen as defining the
carrying capacity of the ideological ecosystem. Just as in a biological context,
the ideological ecosystem sets an upper bound on the number of parties, and
will tend to force party consolidation if there are more parties that what the
carrying capacity can permit. Social cleavages are also critically important in
determining how many parties a system will produce, since every party is
differentiated from every other by at least one line of cleavage. Thus, a very
homogenous society might not experience a proliferation of parties, even if its
electoral system is suddenly made more permissive.⁴ Further, particularly
salient cleavages might result in more parties, even as the electoral system
simultaneously puts downward pressure on the number of parties. Finally,
The 2017 French presidential election represented a major shift in the
French party system. In the final round, two candidates faced off against each
other: Emmanuel Macron andMarine Le Pen. Despite the fact that for over 50
years the French presidency was primarily contested by just two parties,
neither of these two major party groups was represented in the final round in
2017. Instead, Emmanuel Macron ran as the leader of a party that he had
created barely a year prior. This party, La République EnMarche! (LREM) was
styled as a party of neither the left nor the right that sought consensus and
progress. Macron faced off against Marine Le Pen, who led the far-right, anti-
immigrant National Front (FN), founded by her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen.
Ultimately, voters coalesced behind Macron and elected him to the presidency
with broad support. In amatter of less than a year, an apparently stable system
had been upended, and the future of France’s political system was very much
in doubt.
Election systems are the driving force behind party systems. y deciding
how votes are translated into political power, election systems determine how
many parties can coexist and what types of parties are able to hold power. The
conventional wisdom in political science is that single-member district (SMD),
plurality systems like France’s produce a stable bifurcated system with two
major party blocs, one on the left and one on the right. owever, there is an
extra quirk to France’s system. oth presidential and legislative seats are
contested in two rounds, with the first round functioning like an open primary.
The second round causes France’s two-party system to be less stable than that
of other, similar countries, producing a higher degree of fractionalization
within the two large blocs. This allowed the FN, a group unaffiliated with either
bloc, to rise to prominence over time.
owever, the presence of this third party was not entirely stable, and
continued to put strain on the party system as the significance of the FN grew.
In 2017, widespread public dissatisfaction with the two major parties created
a breaking point, and the parties collapsed back into a bipolarized system.
Macron and Le Pen were able to take advantage of this moment and
permanently restructure France’s party system, enshrining their parties as
major fixtures of the political system moving forward. Nevertheless, France’s
current electoral system is unstable and potentially dangerous because it is
fertile to the growth of extremist parties and is prone to rapid and significant
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electoral and party systems are endogenous. If we take the effects of electoral
systems on party systems to be true, it stands to reason that parties with an
opportunity to control the electoral system will select one that is most
beneficial to their own continued existence. Therefore, smaller, issue-focused
parties are highly likely to prefer more permissive systems, whereas large, big-
tent parties are likely to prefer exclusionary ones. owever, both electoral
systems and party systems are sticky. Parties must engage in capacity-building
before they can build trust with voters, so a new electoral system will not
immediately precipitate a break in the party structure. Further, voters tend to
favor the status quo election system, and parties that seek to change it face an
uphill battle and are often accused of electoral manipulation. For these
reasons, change to both party systems and electoral systems occurs relatively
slowly, and often both systems change in conjunction with one another.
EXCLUSIONARY AND PERMISSIVE— COMPETING SYSTEMS IN FRANCE
Since the establishment of the French Fifth Republic in 1 5 , France has
almost entirely made use of a two-round system for electing both the president
and themembers of the National Assembly. The first round of election features
all candidates who are running. If one candidate wins a 50 majority, they
are elected. If no candidate crosses this threshold, a second round is held.
Legislative elections occur after one week. These are contested by the top two
candidates from the first round, plus any additional candidates who received
votes totaling more than 12.5 of the registered electorate. Theoretically, this
allowsmore than two candidates to advance to the second round, but so-called
triangulaire elections have become vanishingly rare. Presidential elections,
meanwhile, occur after two weeks, and only the top two finishers from the first
round can stand.
oth of these systems are relatively exclusionary. oth legislators and the
president are elected from SMDs, the lowest possible district magnitude. Since
the districting system is not proportional, there is no vote threshold which a
party must cross to enter parliament. owever, the 12.5 of the vote that must
be achieved to stand in the second round behaves approximately like a vote
threshold, and is very high compared to vote thresholds of other countries. In
fact, France’s threshold was raised twice, explicitly to reduce the number of
parties that could compete.¹ Due to the two-round system, voters are
effectively allowed to communicate their second choice, which is slightly more
permissive than a simple plurality election. Still, the system represents a strict
limit on the extent to which voters can communicate their preferences. The
one way in which the French legislative elections are relatively permissive is
the size of the assembly for a country of France’s size, 577 deputies is a
relatively high number. Nevertheless, France’s system on the balance is closer
to the exclusionary end of the spectrum, and therefore produces a relatively
small number of parties.
At the same time, France also contains two other elections systems that are
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significantly more permissive. These are the local and municipal elections, as
well as elections to the European Parliament (EP). Most municipal elections
operate on a type of proportional system, whereby voters cast ballots for party
lists and seats are filled proportionally to the number of votes cast for each
party.¹¹ hile there has been year-to-year variation in how French elections
to the EP have been conducted, these elections have nearly always been a
proportional system, in which candidates are elected from either large, multi-
member districts or from a single national constituency.¹² Since both the
municipal and EP elections use higher magnitude districts that are
apportioned through some sort of proportional scheme, they are far more
permissive than national French elections. Additionally, there is evidence that
the barrier to entry for new parties is even lower in these elections than would
be expected based on their high degree of permissiveness, as the municipal
and EP elections are perceived to be less important than national elections.
oters are more likely to cast a sincere vote in elections they see as less
important, even if this means their vote is likely to be wasted.¹³ Therefore,
these elections operate as extremely permissive ones, with a high number of
parties represented on the ballot.
UNSTABLE BIPOLARIZATION — THE FRENCH PARTY SYSTEM
Due to the relatively exclusionary federal election system, France s party
system reformed itself into a clearly bipolarized system soon after the
establishment of the Fifth Republic’s electoral rules. y 1 70, the parties of the
left had consolidated into an electoral alliance to improve their chances of
winning the presidency and the legislature, and a large coalition of the right
soon followed suit.¹⁴ onsequently, one of the twomajor parties nearly always
wins the presidency, and the two major parties combined tend to make up a
significant majority of the legislature. Nevertheless, the major blocs on the left
and right remain somewhat fragmented, causing the system to be described as
bipolar multipartism.¹ An assortment of smaller parties usually win
representation in the legislature, though each of these parties clearly belong
either to the coalition of the left or the coalition of the right. This higher degree
of fragmentation is due to the fact that the system is slightly more permissive
than strict plurality voting systems.¹ ecause voters can communicate both
first and second choices, coalitions of parties can coalesce between the first
and second rounds.¹ In fact, the French system theoretically has a carrying
capacity of three parties. This is because the first-round election behaves as
though each district has a magnitude of two, since two winners advance to the
second round. Thus, voters could divide their votes between each of three
parties in the first round and have no vote be wasted. It should also be noted
that, because of the relatively more proportional municipal systems, various
parties other than the two primary ones are well-represented in local
governments. owever, for most of the history of the Fifth Republic, the
nature of social cleavages has organized competition into two blocs. The
dominant cleavages at the inception of the Fifth Republic were religiosity and
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class, both of which corresponded with the left-right divide.¹ Therefore, with
no major cross-cutting cleavage, the system of bipolar multipartism remained
stable.
owever, more recently, a new set of cleavages has begun to restructure
the pattern of competition. In the late 1 70s, the salience of the religious
cleavage was on the decline, and a new issue area was becoming more
important across Europe — immigration and globalization.¹ Jean-Marie Le
Pen founded the FN in 1 72, and by the early 1 0s was able to take advantage
of the growing importance of the cleavage between nativism and
integration.² y appealing to those who perceived themselves as cultural
“losers” of immigration and by amplifying perceptions of difference, the FN
was able to achieve limited electoral success. ecause France’s system has a
carrying capacity of three parties, and because the FN was able to find success
in the more proportional municipal and European systems, it was able to gain
a toehold in the French party space without being stomped out by the two big-
tent coalitions.²¹ y the early 1 0s, the FN had become fully entrenched as
the third pole of the French political space.²² Though it never achieved major
electoral success, it was able to legitimately compete in the first round of
elections since no voter would waste their vote by voting for the FN.²³ Thus,
by the turn of the century, France’s political space was tripolarized, with the
large coalitions of the left and right competing alongside the new nativist pole
represented by the far-right.
WHAT HAPPENED IN 2017?
Leading up to the 2017 election, the classic left and right poles of French
politics faced scandals, party infighting, and defection. The sitting Socialist
president, Fran ois ollande, was leading a historically unpopular
administration. e had struggled to live up to the strong socialist talking
points he put forward in his 2012 campaign, resulting in public clashes
between the “liberal-democrat” moderate left and more radical dissidents
from within his own government.²⁴ Facing clear electoral headwinds,
ollande announced in 201 that he would not stand for re-election,
becoming the first president of the Fifth Republic to do so. Ultimately, the
Socialist nominee enoit amon performed dismally in the polls, and was
overwhelmingly overshadowed by the far-left Jean-Luc Mélenchon.² Thus,
going into the 2017 elections, there was nothing that could be described as a
unified, effective coalition of the left. The right was also fractured, though to a
lesser extent. The leading candidate of the center-right Republicans, Fran ois
Fillon, was the subject of a corruption and nepotism scandal that negatively
impacted his polling.² The Republicans were also being pulled in two
different directions, as both those who supported Macron’s insurgent LREM
and supporters of Le Pen’s FN fought with the main wing of the party.² ith
disarray in both traditional blocs, the circumstances could not have been
better for insurgent parties seeking a symbolic victory to cement themselves as
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legitimate alternatives.
Meanwhile, Marine Le Pen had been championing a campaign to make
her far-right National Front more palatable and to break the long-standing
taboo against collaborating with the FN. This has been broadly successful. The
FN has remained true to its nationalist, populist, and anti-immigrant roots,
but has managed to broaden its appeal, and the distinction between moderate
and extreme right has begun to fade.² This can also be seen in the FN’s
presidential results. In 2002, Jean-Marie Le Pen earned 1 . of the first-
round vote, and became the first FN candidate to reach the second round of a
presidential election. owever, he received a dismal 17. of the second-
round vote, demonstrating a clear ceiling on his support. Fifteen years later,
his daughter Marine would expand her vote share by more than ten percent
between the first and second rounds, showing that she has been able to
broaden the FN’s electoral coalition.
The first round of the 2017 election was very closely contested, with four
candidates receiving between 1 and 2 percent of the vote. Macron lead with
2 , and Marine Le Pen was sent to the second round by the barest of
margins— her 21. beat Fillon of the Republicans by 1. and only
outstripped the far-left Mélenchon by 1.7 . Therefore, it wasn t enough that
two insurgent parties performed well. Their rise had to coincide with serial
failure of the traditional parties. ad either the left or the right been more
internally unified, their combined votes would have beaten both Macron and
Le Pen by a healthy margin. After the first round, most parties coalesced
around Macron, because working with the FN remained somewhat of a taboo.
As a result, Macron coasted to an easy victory.
ictory in the first presidential round, even by margins so small that the
majority of voters actually opposed both Macron and Le Pen, is tremendously
valuable in terms of creating legitimacy for new parties. Le Pen’s father’s
success in the first round in 2002 started the FN down a path towards being a
major player in politics.² Furthermore, France has a strongly presidential
system.³ This is unusual in Europe, and it allows the executive to assume
office without the support or confidence of the legislature. This primacy of the
executive was taken one step further in the early 2000s when the election
calendar was restructured so that the legislative elections would always follow
presidential ones within the same year.³¹ This has resulted in a “honeymoon
cycle,” whereby the legislative elections reward parties that performed well in
the presidential cycle, while handing a governingmajority to the newly-elected
president.³² Accordingly, Macron s LREM and allies won a majority, and the
FN secured a commanding third place in the first-round popular vote,
finishing just a few points behind the Republicans.³³ owever, FN would end
up with few seats, because of voters’ tendency to align themselves against the
party in the second round. Despite this, the 2017 election was the best showing
FN has ever had under a two-round system. They demonstrated a high
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capacity to advance to the second round, meaning that ballots cast for them in
the first round were not “wasted votes,” but rather the results of a legitimate
strategic choice.³⁴ Since rational voters tend to vote strategically based on a
party’s perceived strength, the compelling results for the FN in the legislative
elections indicate that they are here to stay.
This was confirmed in 201 , when a round of municipal elections
convincingly demonstrated that the presidential electoral shifts were a sign of
longer-lasting change. In major cities across France, the disarrayed Socialists
lurched to the left, campaigning very closely with the green and communist
parties. This resulted in the victory of many green candidates, as well as other
leftists supported by the greens, in a “green wave.”³ Though the Socialists did
perform far better than they did at a national level in 2017, they were forced to
rely heavily on far-left forces that pulled the party further left.³ Even then,
most major Socialist victories were by locally-popular incumbents, whose
strength may fade over time. These victories came largely at the expense of
LREM, though Macron’s party competed very strongly given that the
president’s party tends to fare poorly in midterm elections.³ Meanwhile, in
the European Parliament elections, LREM and the FN (renamed National
Rally) coasted to comfortable first- and second-place victories. Far from being
a major political force, the Socialists have become just one of the many minor
parties contained within the far-left bloc. Meanwhile, LREM, the remainder of
the Republicans, and the far-right were each able to compete as a distinct
coalition, though LREM did sometimes also ally itself with moderate
incumbent Republicans.³ The relatively proportional nature of the municipal
and European elections means that these four blocs can legitimately compete.
owever, by the presidential election in 2022, themore exclusionary national-
level system will require the four parties to consolidate in some way to support
the system’s the carrying capacity of only three parties.
COLLAPSING BACK TO BIPOLARIZATION
Social cleavages can forecast the manner in which the parties will
consolidate. As of 2017, the transformation away from the old cleavages of
class and religion is nearly complete.³ The French political space is now
overwhelmingly defined by two new cleavages — a social one, between a
nativist anti-immigrant pole and a multicultural pro-integration pole, and an
economic one, between a neoliberal pro-globalization pole and an
interventionist anti-globalization pole.⁴ Each of the four major coalitions, as
they were in the 2017 presidential election, belong to one quadrant of this
space:
Figure 1: French political cleavages and party affiliations, as shown on a quadrant model
NATIONALIST PRO-INTEGRATION
PRO-GLOBALIZATION Republicans LREM
ANTI-GLOBALIZATION FN leftist parties
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The primary cleavage at work in French society is the nationalist integration
divide, which has now fully matured to form the division between the left and
right sides of the political spectrum. The FN was the first to capitalize on the
emerging nationalist integration cleavage, and represents a populist, nativist
pole. The moderate right is also moving closer to this culturally-conservative
position, though not to the same extent. This pole is most strongly opposed by
the parties of the left, which represent an open, cosmopolitan pole. owever,
the FN has also successfully pivoted to embrace an additional sort of populism,
one that allies itself with those of the working class who see themselves as
losers of globalization.⁴¹ Thus, the FN is also economically nationalist, and
advocates for intervention to protect domestic businesses and workers. The
far-left also supports more regulation and intervention, but for profoundly
different reasons, emphasizing ecological and redistributive benefits.
Meanwhile, the two more centrist parties are opposed to this interventionist
take, and both tend to support a pro-globalization pole.⁴²
owever, these two cleavages do not form a two-dimensional political
space. The FN is ideologically furthest from the far-left, even though they both
support higher degrees of economic intervention. The nationalist integration
divide is the more salient of the two, and prevents the FN from ever joining a
coalition or campaigning with the far left. Thus, the political space should be
understood as one-dimensional. The nationalism integration divide forms the
distinction between the left and the right. Meanwhile, issues of globalization
versus intervention divide the center of each bloc from its extremes.⁴³ This
one-dimensional structure of the political space forecasts how parties are
likely to consolidate themselves in advance of the elections in 2022.
In 2022, parties are likely to collapse back into two broad electoral
coalitions, one on the left and one on the right. The broadening appeal of the
FN and a convergence on the right towards cultural conservatism indicates
movement towards a more cohesive bloc on the right.⁴⁴ Though there still is a
meaningful distinction between the Republicans and the FN, the results of the
2017 election show that voters from either of those groups are willing to vote
for the other. Meanwhile, on the left, LREM has largely outcompeted the





Figure 2: French political cleavages and party affiliations, shown by alignment from left to right
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Socialists for the support of the moderate left — some Socialist incumbents
remain strong locally, but the national party has been eviscerated. The
remainder of the Socialists, as well as smaller parties on the far-left, will likely
continue to work together as they did in the 2020 municipal elections,
eventually moving toward a more united far-left front. This would be a
meaningful change from the pre-2017 tripartite political space.
The restructuring of the party system that came to a head in 2017 should be
seen as a success story of the far-right. France’s electoral system proved to be
a uniquely fertile petri dish for far-right populism. Jean-Marie Le Pen’s FN
was able to engage in capacity-building by contesting the relatively permissive
municipal and European elections. From there, the party was able to make the
leap into national-level politics, where the carrying capacity of three parties
allowed space for one more to compete. For over 20 years, the FN represented
one pole of a tripolarized system. Then, in 2017, they were able to seize the
moment and reshape the political system around themselves. This has moved
the entire party system to the right, as the Socialists, formerly the major
center-left party, have been relegated to being a part of a loose far-left
coalition. Macron and his allies, who were described three years ago as
centrists, are the closest thing that remains to a moderate left party.
Meanwhile, the Republicans have moved to the right, accelerated by the loss
of their moderate members to LREM. Lastly, the FN has cemented itself as an
electoral force that will continue to shape the political landscape in France,
even if they are not able to win the presidency outright.
INSTANT-RUNOFF VOTING — CONSENSUS OVER CHAOS
For electoral reformers, there is a debate as to whether strongly exclusive
systems or strongly proportional systems present the greatest danger of
extremists holding sway within government. In highly proportional systems,
more extreme parties on both sides are able to gain seats in the legislature,
though they remain fringe parties that tend to gain few seats. Meanwhile, in
exclusionary systems, the most extreme tendencies of left and right are rolled
into big-tent coalitions or parties. Though this prevents extreme parties from
gaining their own seats, it allows extreme parties to pull the major parties
away from the center, and thus causes politics to be more extreme as a whole.
Regardless of which of these situations is better, France’s system is worse than
either. It has allowed a place for an extremist party to slowly gain legitimacy,
as well as seats in local, national, and supranational governments. owever,
since the system is not proportional, it also allowed the FN to radically
restructure the pattern of party competition and become a legitimate
ideological pole in and of itself. Thus, France should serve as a cautionary tale
against similar two-round ballot schemes.
Electoral reform is always on the table in France, and should be strongly
considered. The damage of the FN in terms of restructuring the party system
has been done and France will likely collapse back into a stable bipolarized
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arrangement, albeit one that is further to the right and much more friendly to
nationalist extremism. owever, it is impossible to predict what emerging
social cleavage may drive the growth of another radical, fringe party which
could similarly destabilize the party system. Therefore, France ought to do
away with its two-round balloting system for the legislature. Further, the
competing election systems at different levels should be homogenized. This
will help disable the ladder of engagement that the FN used to climb from
obscurity to political prominence.
The easiest means to achieve this is to return to the proportional system
that France used brie y in 1 . Though a proportional system would likely
accordmore seats to the FN than the two-round system, the FN’s share of seats
would still represent a small minority of the legislature. Further, a
proportional system would prevent the Republicans from needing to
cooperate with the FN, and thus reverse the recent trend of integrating
extremism into the political establishment. owever, in the presidential
elections, instituting electoral reform through proportionalism is more
difficult. The presidential election is arguably the more important of the two in
determining party structure, and there is no way tomake a single-winner office
proportional. Simply doing away with the second electoral round would
eventually result in a stable two-party system. owever, the stickiness of
existing party systems means that there is a relatively high chance of the FN
securing a large minority of ballots, winning the presidency outright before a
two-party regime could solidify. This is too large of a risk. France’s best option
for their presidential elections is one that has not yet been tried in France — an
instant-runoff system. This system has the same theoretical basis of the two-
round system, in that losing candidates are struck from the ballot and voters
who cast their votes for losers are allowed to vote for someone else in a later
round. owever, instant-runoff voting eliminates only one candidate per
round, and thus avoids the problem of first-round vote-splitting that was
observed in 2017, ensuring that the candidates who advance from each round
collectively have majority support.⁴ This means that in a scenario like the
2017 election, neither Macron nor Le Pen would become president, since both
traditional blocs achieved more combined votes. More importantly, however,
it would prevent the formation of the 2017 narrative of success for Macron and
Le Pen, since the winners of the first round would no longer dominate the
media cycle. Thus, radical shifts in perceived party strength would be unlikely,
and the party system would be much less vulnerable to shocks in the future.
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Instant-Runoff voting is one of many voting systems collectively described as “ranked-choice” systems. In these
systems, voters are allowed to make a list of candidates, in order of their preference rather than selecting ust
one candidate. Instant-runoff voting is then able to simulate multiple rounds of balloting based on the order in
which voters rank their choices. In the first of these rounds, each voter s first choice is counted, and the rest of
the choices are ignored for the time being. If one candidate receives more than 50 of first-choice votes, they
win the election. If no candidate has achieved this number, the candidate with the fewest first-choice votes is
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eliminated from the election.Then, any voters whose first choice was eliminated will have their vote count instead
for their second choice. This is mathematically equivalent to holding a second election with every candidate but
the eliminated one. These rounds continue by eliminating the candidate with the fewest votes and reapportioning
the votes of those who voted for that candidate to their next choice down the ballot. As soon as one candidate
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